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Abstract: Growing attention to a rift between epistemology and 
ontology, between words and things, sets new challenges and 
invigorations for a Rhetoric of Science that traditionally aims to 
“analyze and evaluate the persuasive communications of scientists” 
(Ceccarelli, 2017, para. 6). Rhetoricians confront a vibrant, new 
intellectual space where scholars across disciplines are seeking to 
better account for bodies and moving to “include the materiality of 
our ambient environs” in their analyses (Rickert, 2013, p. x). The 
question, in light of material expansions, is what is a Rhetoric of 
Science, and what are its futures? 
In response to the Rhetoric Society of America’s 2018 conference 
call for junior and senior scholars to discuss “major developments 
in rhetorical studies,” we offer a Feyerabendian innovation-meets-
dogma performative session: the junior scholar, representing 
innovation, argues that Rhetoric of Science must move 
aggressively beyond a study of texts and scientific language to 
account for continuous technological, social, and biological 
entanglements; specifically, that to expand the field’s practices to 
include neuro-cognitive approaches and other forms of 
experiment. The senior scholar, representing dogma, expresses 
caution, arguing that the domain of a Rhetoric of Science is still 
symbols and semiosis; specifically, that looking at “ambient 
rhetorics” and “entanglements” is another approach, not a 
foundational shift. 
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David Gruber: To start, I want to say that Rhetoric of Science [RoS] 
is under-studied even by rhetoric scholars. In graduate school, I 
was one of maybe two pursuing it, and it never felt central to the 
field; perhaps, this is because it requires knowing about a very 
different and often derided disciplinary area. To do RoS, you have 
to learn the science or a considerable part. Lots of rhetoric scholars 
have to become interdisciplinary; those in Rhetoric of Religion and 
Politics, for example, have to do a lot of background work, but RoS 
can or should be particularly good at examining how scientific 
experiments are made and justified in addition to analyzing the 
ways that findings are applied or sold to the public. Any extra work 
being ascribed to RoS there in that comment is intended to drive at 
a key point: science happening in the lab, on the initial inventional 
and pragmatic level, remains ripe for rhetoricians yet under-
examined. And I think the lack of work within the scientific process 
indicates a problem of how we, as rhetorical scholars, think about 
ourselves. Overall, I want to argue that we imagine ourselves 
talking about science mostly after-the-fact, after the press release, 
after the popular media presentation, and not sitting in and 
amongst the working processes of shaping science.  
Randy Allen Harris: You kids today…! You want under-studied?! 
Try my grad school experience, in the good old days (well, except 
for disco and Ronald Reagan), the 1980s. A few of us had to 
propose and cajole our way into a directed reading course by, or 
rather under, the not-yet-venerable and always irrepressible James 
P. Zappen. Despite the presence of Jim in the department, and of S. 
Michael Halloran, there was nothing on the books, and I’m pretty 
sure Jim didn’t get paid for it. We had the feeling of being pioneers, 
following the explorers and the scouts into territories not exactly 
uncharted, but charted with the blunter instruments of sociologists, 
philosophers, and historians. RoS certainly felt understudied at the 
time. Every article had to begin with a justification. Some articles 
were nothing but justifications. Now, RoS feels like a cottage 
industry, with regular articles and books and conference panels or 
presentations, virtually dedicated journals, thriving graduate 
programs, its own society (now 25 years old!). There’s even an oral-
history project. There’s a whole lot of studyin’ goin’ on.  
     But I don’t miss your central point, once we both stop 
reminiscing about grad school, that much of the studyin’ these days 
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is off-base. Some aspects of science—the real, true aspects of 
science, you imply—go unstudied by rhetoricians. Do we have an 
equivalent of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s Laboratory Life or 
Peter Galison’s Image and Logic, which are anthropological/ethno-
graphic lab studies? Perhaps not. Many rhetoricians, myself 
included, are more comfortable with a text in front of us than a 
scientist in front of us, a beaker in her hand. But, first, don’t forget 
that science is done with texts, even more than with beakers—that’s 
one of the central claims of RoS–and in fact we do have quasi-
anthropological/ethnographic works like Charles Bazerman’s 
“Physicists Reading Physics” and Greg Myers’s “The Social 
Construction of Two Biologists' Proposals” (Bazerman, 1985; 
Myers, 1984). Even more relevantly, we have a new generation of 
RoSers growing up with the advent of citizen science, like Ashley 
Rose Mehlenbacher and James Wynn, who are participant-
rhetoricians, as well as flexible older generation RoSers, like 
Carolyn R. Miller, who are engaged in this work as well.  
     My own beef (but not just mine; Leah Ceccarelli has turned it 
into a mantra, “Where’s the rhetoric?”) is less with what is being 
studied than with how it is being studied. There is work being done, 
much of it good, by RoSers, which doesn’t involve very much 
rhetoric. The Grand Poobah of this approach is Alan G. Gross, who 
is perhaps the single most important rhetorician of science and also 
perhaps the least rhetorical. He has always been happier with 
methodologies from philosophy or sociology than from rhetoric, 
and, after his rhetoric-without-constraints period, has settled into a 
prolonged rhetoric-as-handmaid period. Indeed, his important 
work with Joe Harmon on visualization in science (Gross and 
Harmon, 2013) and his new book on the scientific sublime might be 
characterized as a why-even-bother-with-rhetoric period (Gross, 
2018). But he is far from alone. The rhetorical quotient in RoS work 
is often distressingly slight, limited sometimes to the use of the 
word rhetoric once or twice.  
Gruber: Rhetoric that doesn’t involve much rhetoric? Well, perhaps 
this leads me to how RoS is, in my view, too often misunderstood. 
Ceccarrelli, one of the major contributors to the growth and dignity 
of our field, whose work I respect and enjoy, recently wrote an 
online article for The Conversation magazine. Her title is 
“Defending Science: How Rhetoric Can Help” (Ceccarrelli, 2017). I 
was glad to see the article. Given the current atmosphere around 
government funding of science in the United States, the effort is 
appreciated. However, I was struck by the way Ceccarelli tells a 
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story of rhetoric historically distrusting scientists and critiquing 
them only to more recently turn to seeing scientists as united with 
us “in the fight against forces that would starve higher education of 
funding. Many rhetoricians began to see their mission not as taking 
scientists down a peg or two, but as helping scientists improve their 
public communication” (2017). Ceccarelli goes on to detail how 
rhetoricians have helped scientists “understand their audiences,” 
think of “more accurate and less alarming metaphors,” find useful 
figures of speech to “debunk skeptics,” and to build a “trustworthy 
character” (2017). All of this is true, of course. But nowhere is RoS 
characterized as studying experimental processes or as a 
participant in the development of scientific aims and the structure 
of experiments.  
Harris: True. Even a chef as dexterous as Ceccarelli can only fry so 
many fish at a time. She is pointing out an important cultural 
mission of RoS for a general audience, not exploring its critical 
dimensions for a specialist audience. 
Gruber: Work like Jordynn Jack’s “Mapping the Semantic 
Structure of Cognitive Neuroscience” or Melissa Littlefield’s 
experiments in lie detection should not be invisible in 
characterizations of RoS (Jack, Beam, Huettel, Moody, & 
Appelbaum, 2014; Littlefield, Dietz, Fitzgerald, Knudsen, & Tonks, 
2015). I recognize that these kinds of engagements are still few and 
unlikely to get a mention in a general overview designed for public 
consumption. But I still want to say that these efforts might be 
misunderstood. Ceccarelli aside, generally speaking, 
experimentation or interdisciplinary collaboration to create a new 
experiment that answers a specific question of a rhetoric scholar 
could be perceived as an ‘adventure’ or ‘side project’ designed to 
tactically enhance the scholarly profile. But I think such 
characterizations do RoS a disservice. To be brief: We need to stop 
talking about RoS as something about language, something about 
texts, something about the way that science can be explained to the 
public. 
Harris: Er, no, we don’t. Rhetoric is about texts (broadly 
construed; the flickering overhead lights in this room are a text). 
RoS is about scientific texts (broadly construed; I’m including 
beakers here, and colliders). But you are right that there is plenty 
more work to do than helping scientists talk to the public, and I 
enthusiastically agree that folks like Jack and Littlefield are doing 
it.  
  
Gruber 
Harris 5  POROI 14,2 (February 2019) 
 
Gruber: Just in case we’re talking at cross-purposes, allow me to 
stop you there. What I want to say is that RoS can no longer be 
limited to being a field content to investigate scientific texts, big T 
or little t. The central pivot point of RoS cannot be anything about a 
text in the current state of the broader field. I’ll call upon Thomas 
Rickert here and say, “Rhetoric is itself ontological,” which is a 
statement that more or less suggests that the field must expand and 
become about studying continuous technological, social, and 
biological entanglements (2013, p. vi). This idea pushes us well 
beyond texts. To go back to Rickert: “Rhetoric cannot be 
understood as suasion attempted between discrete or among 
aggregate subjects embedded in a transitive subject-driven view of 
rhetorical situations. Rhetoric is not, finally, a shift in the mental 
states of subjects but something world-transforming for individuals 
and groups immersed in vibrant, ecologically attuned 
environments” (2013, p. xvi).  
     Of course, I am not going to dispute that RoS should examine 
how bodies are textual and textualized, infused with discourses, co-
constituted by interactions with many big T- and little t-texts. 
Textualizations of the body are pertinent to rhetorical scholarship 
since texts are often central to deliberations about the body and 
burrowed into public and institutional sense making. Nevertheless, 
RoS, as a study of texts or scientific language, risks missing 
Rickert’s point when he says that, “Rhetoric is itself ontological.” 
We can’t get stuck on scientific texts because we would miss the 
machines, the living performances, the affects, and florescent 
lighting in the room that makes us feel crazy or the smell of sewage 
at a landfill. (The effects of florescent lighting, like the seething 
piles of garbage living, breathing, and stealing breath outside the 
city, are not only textual.) I risk getting off-point here as I 
originally intended to primarily argue for getting more involved in 
the actions of scientific experimentation in order to answer 
rhetorical questions, but I feel the need to pause at your statement 
“RoS is about scientific texts.”  
Harris: Yes, we can use experimentation, and other forms of 
scientific research, to answer rhetorical questions, but you have 
turned Rickert into a zealot here, dropping an important 
subordinate phrase. He says, “On this approach [namely, on his 
ambient-rhetoric approach] rhetoric cannot be understood …” He is 
not saying, as you seem to want him to say, that rhetoric can no 
longer ever study the trade of suasions among the sorts of beings 
who traffic in texts, discrete and/or aggregate subjects. While I 
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admire his ambient rhetoric proposals, I take them as an 
augmentation of traditional rhetorical criticism, a new and 
important grounding for traditional rhetorical criticism, a set of 
resources for traditional rhetorical criticism, a continuation of 
Kenneth Burke’s globalization project, not as a replacement of 
traditional rhetorical criticism.  
Gruber: That’s where we run square into another difficulty. Adding 
scientific partnership and adoption of scientific experimentation 
into RoS confronts the area where the field is most ‘unstudied’: 
from within the scientific lens. That is to say, rhetoric’s internally 
accepted theories and narratives of co-constitutive, scaffolded, or 
compositional worlds teeming with life and wrapped up in a 
complex material milieu remain supported mostly through appeals 
to former rhetorical scholars, mostly investigated through textual 
analysis and mostly detailed through ideas in continental 
philosophy, residing relatively independent of scientific, biological 
investigations. Traditional rhetorical work takes us a long way 
down the road of knowing the body and our world better. However, 
I think that RoS also needs to move toward adopting the scientific 
lens as one additional valid way to consider what we’re now so 
interested in, i.e. materiality and the asignifiying affects/effects in 
persuasion.  
     To be blunt about it: I wonder if we can, on the one hand, 
celebrate pro-science protest signs, many of which have recently 
read, “Science is real” / “Climate change is real” / “Have Polio? No? 
Thanks, Science!” and still, on the other hand, dismiss scientific 
processes as less useful or dangerous methods for rhetorical 
scholars who must avoid the slippery slope of scientism, 
objectification, and universalization. Can we affirm science on the 
one hand and then say that we need to stick to discursive work for 
fear of becoming overly deterministic or losing what we ‘do best’ in 
English and Communication Departments? The obvious retort is to 
simply say that ‘we should do this, while they do that’ because clear 
distinctions make for defined field areas and follow from our 
history. Yet I wonder if the mentality of ‘they do this, and we do 
that’ risks missing the point of our own serious investment in doing 
more with rhetoric by turning to materiality, affect, and the body. 
Harris: To be blunt, yes, of course we can. We can celebrate 
painters, study their craft, and critique their art without painting. 
We can study sculptors without sculpting, farmers without farming, 
scientists without sciencing. But I will be blunter yet: You 
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misunderstand RoS specifically and rhetoric more generally. Its 
domain is symbols and semiosis, which means texts.  
Gruber: groans audibly, releases a sigh.  
Harris: But that doesn’t mean we can’t learn from science. For all 
its finely wrought and natively forged tools for the study of symbolic 
inducement, rhetoric is always on the lookout for more ways to 
study the style and context and structure and resonances of 
inducing symbols. Rhetoric is opportunistic. And science has some 
pretty neat tools.  
Gruber: Yes, science has neat tools, but if those tools are not merely 
playing in a representational field divorced from material worlds 
that influence us, then why not use those tools too? Rhetoric, as you 
say, is opportunistic. So let’s live up to the designation. Of course, I 
agree that we can celebrate science, study the craft and critique the 
art, as you say; but that’s not what we are debating here exactly. I 
think we are asking if we must or must not try to consider an 
analysis of bodies and materialities outside of and/or alongside of 
textualizations, and we seem to also be asking if we can adopt 
scientific experimentation in RoS and still call it RoS. 
     To the latter point, in my view, there are cases where we, as 
rhetorical scholars, must engage science and can use scientific 
processes to answer our own questions. Not every question posed 
by a rhetorician has an answer in a text or in the existing rhetorical 
canon, especially questions about affect and materiality. Likewise, 
not every question has an answer adequately supplied by existing 
scientific studies. Consider the debate about identification, as an 
example. Without getting too far into it here, I would say that Diane 
Davis’ reformulation of identification as always-already there, in 
contrast to Burke’s view that is it compensatory to a pre-existing 
division, sits unresolved (Davis, 2008). Davis’ view, seems to me, 
remains up-in-the-air because it depends on theorization from 
Freud and draws on neuroscientific ideas about mirror neurons 
that have since been overturned or re-theorized in the 
neurosciences as a result of additional observations (See Hickok, 
2014); so here, in this case, we have an opportunity to look again at 
the question of identification and see if further scientific 
experiment can illuminate bodily engagements. We can clarify 
what, exactly, Davis or anyone else might be able to do with this 
now fuzzy term ‘identification.’ Perhaps ‘identifications’ would be 
more fitting. But in terms of developing new theorizations, I don’t 
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think that she needs to wait for neuroscience to confirm or deny her 
ideas; she can be actively involved now and work with scientists to 
develop other kinds of research questions if she chooses. So I want 
to argue for embracing scientific processes and building our own 
experiments and making blended methodologies—not merely 
critiquing those processes in the sciences—and to do so, I think 
we’ll need to overcome historical/philosophical resistance that 
remains.  
Harris: You’re not listening, youngster. I am saying we should use 
those tools. I’m all for embracing scientific processes and 
technologies. I’m currently engaged in fancy-tool projects. One of 
them knowledge-engineers an ontology of rhetorical figures. 
Another explores the role of the neurocognitive principles of style 
when they are realized in language breakdowns; for instance, in 
dementia. But those projects are pursuits of cognitive science, not 
rhetoric of science. They are rhetorical, certainly, and they help tell 
us things about rhetoric. But rhetoric is more the object of study in 
these projects than the methodology. Sticking just with figures and 
style, there are all kinds of efforts researching tropes in psychology, 
in developmental terms, in categorization, and in concept 
formation. Computational linguists are researching irony in the 
Twittersphere, detecting chiasmi in the Europarl corpus, exploring 
the potential of epanaphora for argument mining. Cognitive 
linguists are now paying considerable attention to repetition, a 
neurocognitive affinity that is basal not just to style but to 
communication even in its pre-symbolic aspects.  
     We might see these efforts, collectively, as research into the 
science of rhetoric, to use a familiar term (Harris, 2013). (As an 
aside, this work would be much richer if the researchers bothered to 
talk to rhetoricians, and I encourage an interdisciplinarity that 
would get rhetoricians involved in it.) But, however much we can 
and should make use of its results in all forms of rhetorical 
criticism, the science of rhetoric is not the rhetoric of science. If we 
are asking, “Can we adopt scientific experimentation in RoS and 
still call it RoS?” my answer, based largely on terminological 
hygiene, is no.  
Gruber: I guess I’m not very hygienic. I think we should all get our 
hands dirty. In a recent book chapter in Methodologies of Rhetoric 
of Health and Medicine, I touch on a few reasons why rhetoric 
scholars resist scientific experimentation (2018). Some exploration 
on this topic has yielded the following ideas: 
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1. Rhetoric, as a field, was never interested in simplified or staged 
settings, preferring in-situ human interactions so that the 
discourse would be situated and the text not decontextualized. 
2. Experiment risks upsetting rhetoric’s two main historical roles, 
as outlined by Alan Gross in 1994: 
a. developing theories of how such areas are socially 
negotiated and communicated to the public; and 
b. helping scientists communicate with the public.  
3. Marxism’s historical tie to place and personal experience—and 
rhetoric’s historical affinity with critical-cultural approaches—
embraces the notion that the social and political mystifications 
of life are not best elucidated in a laboratory but in the streets, 
or in the libraries where records of the streets are housed.  
4. Pursuing experiment would mean adding a layer of 
rhetoricalness to what is already rhetorical, doubling the task of 
the rhetorical scholar. Untangling what one is doing rhetorically 
while testing rhetorical concepts is a messy enterprise. 
     Each of the above contentions needs to be tackled. But for now, 
I’ll pose the question of whether we can usefully comment on 
materiality, affect, and the body without finding ways to study 
connections between signifying and asignifying materiality. If we 
want to see the world in multiple dimensions, then the world may 
be rhetorical, yes, but also More Than, Other Than, and sometimes 
In Opposition To the circulation of signifiers. Accepting this 
premise, I believe, requires turning to neuro/biological/gastro-
enterological/physical scientific processes and finding ways to 
expand rhetorical ideas and to do science, when useful, in RoS.  
Harris: Your ear is, I think, closer to the RoS ground than mine, so 
I will defer to you on the question of how unstudied it actually is 
from an experimental perspective. You are overgeneralizing, 
however, to identify experimentation with a scientific lens; many 
sciences conduct no experiments. I can’t call to mind any rhetorical 
experiments.  
     But none of your four resistance factors are in any way 
insurmountable. Indeed, not all of them are even resistance factors.  
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1. Rhetoric, for long stretches, has been not only interested in, 
but also obsessed with staged settings. Don’t forget the second 
sophistic, or the belletristic and elocutionary movements, and 
the centrality of epideictic rhetoric for many rhetoricians and 
rhetorical movements. This, of course, does not open the door 
to experimentation, but it does mitigate your claim that a 
natural in situ (if not in vivo) disposition precludes in vitro 
research in rhetoric.  
2. I see no risk here.  
3. Even Marxists conduct ‘social experiments,’ with housing 
projects, free injection sites, and the like. Ontario, for instance, 
recently implemented a three-year basic-income project, 
giving 4,000 people a guaranteed income to measure the 
impact of such a plan [This project was ongoing in June 2018, 
when the dialogue occurred, but cancelled two months later, 
after the election of a socially regressive government].  
4. You got me there: It’s more work, and it’s messy. 
Gruber: You make good points, but I’ll hold my ground: RoS is 
historically understudied, currently misunderstood as a discursive 
discipline whose usefulness is in being a service to scientists or 
their communicative efforts, and has a future path in practical 
engagement that has, up to now, gone largely unstudied. As a field, 
we’ve been too interested in artifacts made after the science is, 
more or less, over.  
Harris: We agree it is understudied, though we use somewhat 
different metrics. We agree, too, that it is misunderstood, though 
again we diverge on specifics. It is a discursive discipline, and it 
does have utility in the cultural service of science—which is to say, 
in the service of facts and evidence and standards of argumenta-
tion. But that is not its only cultural service. Rhetoricians study the 
ways in which knowledge is made, because epistemology is a 
symbolic enterprise, not just the way knowledge is propagated. We 
agree, finally and most strongly, on your suggestions of borrowing 
what we can from scientists to study rhetoric, and rhetorically study 
science.  
     But, of course, we are in a dialectical space, and Burke tells us 
that the dialectical pressures push us apart, not together (1941, p. 
139): it would not do to end on agreement. So I will first push you, 
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then pull you. The push: The burden of proof on someone who 
endorses something new is to show that it works. You need to show 
the success of rhetorical experimentation. The pull: 
Experimentation is not the only method we can borrow from 
science. Longitudinal observation, for instance, could open up a 
field of developmental rhetoric: when, in a child’s acquisition of 
language, does metaphor appear? Is a sense of ethos inborn or, like 
theory of mind, does it appear developmentally? In my own work, I 
build knowledge representations, models, something else that 
science does best.  
Gruber: Who gets the last word here? The senior or the junior 
scholar? Well, since I’m the junior scholar and, presumably, have 
more time to persuade and publish, I’ll leave it there. 
Harris: Good point. I’m many decades closer to the worms and the 
fishing poles of retirement, and to the worms of another state of 
being, best not mentioned, with many fewer words left to squeeze 
out, so I’ll go last, with an anecdote from Richard Feynman. “When 
I was young, we had a lot of new ideas about quanta,” he said, or 
something very much like it, “and there were lots of old men who 
resisted these ideas by all sorts of methods. They were very foolish 
to say we were wrong. Even Einstein thought quantum theory was 
crazy.” This was in the early 1990s. An interviewer was asking him 
about superstring theories. “But now I’m an old man,” he went on, 
“and I know old men resist new stuff just because it’s new. But, 
goddamn it, this new stuff is crazy and wrong!” (Davies & Brown, 
1988, p. 193-194).  
     I’ll leave the moral of this fable to you, and to the audience.  
Copyright © 2019 David R. Gruber and Randy Allen Harris 
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